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Abstract
It is very significant to explore the interacting relationship 
between the basic medical insurance and commercial 
medical insurance for improving the medical security 
system. Based on the analytical framework of expected 
utility theory, by analyzing the model of insurance demand 
theory, this article shows following: the interacting 
relationship between the basic medical insurance and 
commercial medical insurance is either “Complementary 
Effect ” or “Crowd-out Effect”. The dominant relationship 
is decided is depend on the probability of illness in the 
elderly and the setting rate of basic medical insurance 
reimbursement. When both medical insurances coexist, if 
both price and quantity of commercial medical insurance 
reach the optimum point, the expect utility of the medical 
security for the aged will maximize.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past five years, the construction of elderly medical 
security has obtained the remarkable achievement. By the 
end of 2011 (K. N. Rask & K. J. Rask, 2000), the both 
percentages of elderly people with basic insurance in city 
and rural were respectively 74.1% and 44.7%, a problem 
of “a sense of security” for elderly people were improved 
greatly. However, as one of the two mighty pillars in 
medical security system, the basic insurance is limited to 
its strength security and quality guarantee by nonprofit 
nature and spread ability. The current phenomenon of 
“poverty due to illness” from elderly people frequently 
happens and proves the limits of basic insurance. Simplex 
basic medical insurance system has already not satisfied 
the increasing requirements of the medical insurance 
for elderly people. To solve the “demand beyond the 
basic medical security”, we should devote more efforts 
to develop the commercial medical insurance system, 
and this is only one channel to achieve the major goal 
of “healthy aging” from the World Health Organization 
(WHO).
1. SUMMARIES
Foreign scholars have done a lot of researches to study 
the relationship between the basic medical insurance and 
the commercial medical insurance, and the results of 
researches tend to belief of “ free medical resources have 
a negative impact on private medical insurance”. For 
instance, Rask and Rask (2000) find that public medical 
care has a crowded-out effect on the private insurance 
in the middle and lower income group. Herring (2005) 
proves that the existence of the charity medical care 
impedes the purchase behavior of insurance in the local 
low-income group. Lo Sasso and Meyer (2006) find the 
Crowd-out Effect is apparent in the two age groups. Qin 
(2010) verifies that the density of all kinds of Healthcare 
Safety Network is positively related to the scale of 
Crowd-out Effect. But unfortunately, the studies above 
are questioned by other scholars in a certain degree and 
have failed to reach a consensus. For instance, both 
studies of Shore－Sheppard (2005) and Thorpe and 
Florence (1998) show that the public insurance does not 
29 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
LAI Guoyi (2017). 
Canadian Social Science, 13(12), 28-33
have significant crowd-out effect on commercial medical 
insurance.
On the contrary, there are few domestic researches 
on this issue. The reasons are two. On the one hand, as 
the medical security system is still under construction, 
the basic medical insurance and commercial medical 
insurance are lack of coordination with each other in the 
practice. For instance, only few insurance companies 
introduce the elderly medical insurance and put it as a gift 
of bundle sales. On the other hand, the researches are lack 
of supports from relevant theories and current medical 
security researches only focus on the improvement of 
the basic medical insurance system, funding rising and 
the construction of a network system. From both medical 
insurance in the role of the medical insurance system, 
although there are two main type of medical insurances 
which support the system, the basic medical insurance 
obtains more preferential polices and well development 
due to its universality. The commercial medical 
insurance faces many challenges in development as its 
nature is market oriented. Moreover,the supplementary 
role of commercial medical insurance is ranked after 
basic medical insurance and it is situated in the third 
layer of medical security system. This is why the basic 
medical insurance can possibly substitute or impede the 
commercial medical insurance.
Above all, emphasis on research of the relationship 
between the basic medical insurance and commercial 
medical insurance is very significant to the improvement 
of the medical security system and the development of 
commercial medical insurance. On the basis of summary 
above, with the model of insurance demand theory from 
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) study, this article aims to 
build up a utility function model which is able to offer 
the theoretical support the practical works by analyzing 
the mechanism and degree of mutual effect on the basic 
medical insurance and commercial medical insurance.
2. CONSTRUCTOR OF MODEL
The model from this article is developed on the basis 
of “state preference” Model. We assume the following 
conditions: First of all, the elderly obtain the medical 
insurances which mainly consists of basic medical 
insurance and commercial medical insurance, and the 
commercial medical insurance is additional insurance of 
basic medical insurance. Reimbursement of insurance 
should obey the following principle: The reimbursement 
should be firstly done in the scope of basic medical 
insurance, and the rest of unfinished part should be done 
with commercial medical insurance. Meanwhile, ignore 
the exemption and starting point for reimbursement.
Secondly, we assume here are two states of the world 
(1, 0) with two utility functions (U1, U0) for elderly: One 
state of the world 1 is healthy life; another state of the 
world 0 is unhealthy life. The income endowment of 
elderly with healthy life is given with certainly by I e1 and 
that is total income for elderly as well. I e0 is the income 
endowment of elderly with unhealthy life and it is the total 
income I e1 deducted by prospective loss from unhealthy 
life. If P is probability of unhealthy life, θ is prospective 
loss from unhealthy life, α is the reimbursement rate of 
basic medical insurance, f(θ,α) is the utility function for 
the cost of basic medical insurance, and  if there is no 
commercial medical insurance f 'α>0, the utility function 
endowment of elderly is:
   1 1 0 1(1 ) ( ) ( ( , ))e eU p U I p U I f θ α= − ⋅ + ⋅ − . (1)
Assume that the general characteristics of utility 
function are follows: (i) Continous and differentiable. 
(ii) Monotonic, namely the first derivative is greater than 
zero, U"<0. (iii) Diminishing marginal utility, namely the 
second derivation is less than zero.
Thirdly, the different purchaser gets different price and 
reimbursement rate for different insurance in different 
time. But for the elderly, since the probability of unhealthy 
life and the loss magnitude is relatively consistent, we will 
not consider the difference from types of insurance as well 
as the difference from types and compensation way of 
commercial insurance. We assume the β is reimbursement 
rate of commercial medical insurance, g(θ,1-α,β) is cost 
function of commercial insurance, it implies that the rest 
cost of basic medical insurance (1-α) is reimbursed from 
commercial medical insurance. The marginal cost of the 
reimbursement rate of basic insurance α is diminishing 
g'α<0, the marginal cost of the reimbursement rate of 
commercial insurance α is increasing. The individual 
expenditure equals to total expenditure minus both cost 
of basic medical insurance and commercial medical 
insurance. G=θ-f(θ,α)-g(θ,1-α,β). If the elderly continue 
to purchase commercial insurance by themselves, the 
form of cost for the elderly is following: π is the price of 
insurance, it equals to the ratio of marginal income in two 
states of word (0,1) 
 
1 1 1
0 0 0
e
e
dI I I
dI I I
π
−
= − = −
− :…, I1, I0 is actual 
income, I1,-I1
e, is risk cost, s is the amount of insurance 
purchase in state 0 can be calculated as the difference 
between the actual and endowed income s=I0-I0
e. So the 
purchase function of commercial insurance is I1-I1
e=sπ and 
the expected utility function is 
    1 1 0 1( ) [(1 ) ( ) ( ( , ) ( ,1 , ) )]
e eMax U Max p U I s p U I f g sπ θ α θ α β= − ⋅ − + ⋅ − − − + . (3)
    1 1 0 1(1 ) ( ) ( ( , ) ( ,1 , ) )
e eU p U I s p U I f g sπ θ α θ α β= − ⋅ − + ⋅ − − − + . (2)
At last, utility function for the elderly who have purchased the commercial insurance is:
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3. THE ANALYSIS
3.1 Basic
(a) The optimal price of commercial insurance π*and 
optimal purchases of commercial insurance s* Get the 
first-order derivative of s in Function (3) and make it 
equal to zero:
    ' '1 0(1 ) ( )s s
dU p U p U
ds
π= − ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅  . (4)
The optimal condition of first-order derivative is 
 '
0
0 '
1(1 )
p U
p U
π
⋅
=
− ⋅
.
Get the second-order derivative of s 
 2
2
d U
ds
:
    
2
2 '' ''
1 02 (1 )
d U p U p U
ds
π= ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ . (5)
Because of U1
"<0 and U0
"<0 , the
 2
2 0
d U
ds
<
 '* 0
'
1(1 )
p U
p U
π
⋅
=
− ⋅
 1 p
p
−
, the utility 
function is convex to the origin. The stagnation point 
is best solution
 2
2 0
d U
ds
<
 '* 0
'
1(1 )
p U
p U
π
⋅
=
− ⋅
 1 p
p
−
, meanwhile the optimal 
purchase of commercial insurance is s*.
Time 
 2
2 0
d U
ds
<
 '* 0
'
1(1 )
p U
p U
π
⋅
=
− ⋅
 1 p
p
−
 both sides of Equation (5):
   
 '* * 0
'
1
1 Up
p U
π π
− −
= =  . (6)
 *π
−
 1[ ,1]
2
p∈
 * *π π
−
>
 1[0, ]
2
p∈
 * *π π
−
<
 is called as the optimal fair price of insurance, it is 
equal to optimal insurance price timed by the coefficient 
of actual insurance price. The meaning of Equation (6) 
is that optimal fair price of insurance is the result of 
marginal utility of income in the world of state 0 divided 
by marginal utility of income in the world of state 1. 
If
 *π
−
 1[ ,1]
2
p∈
 * *π π
−
>
 1[0, ]
2
p∈
 * *π π
−
<
, then
 *π
−
 1[ ,1]
2
p∈
 * *π π
−
>
 1[0, ]
2
p∈
 * *π π
−
<
. On the contrary, if 
 *π
−
 1[ ,1]
2
p∈
 * *π π
−
>
 1[0, ]
2
p∈
 * *π π
−
<
, 
then
 *π
−
 1[ ,1]
2
p∈
 * *π π
−
>
 1[0, ]
2
p∈
 * *π π
−
< . As shown in graph 1, the π in left side of 
Equation (4) is the slope of line AB for revenue budget, 
right side of equation is the slope of both indifference 
curve L1 and L2.
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Figure 1
Effect Function
Note. I0 is the income in the state 0, I1 is the income in the state 1; L1 and L2 are indifference curves; AB and CD.
AB is the tangent line of curve L1 and the tangent point 
E1 is the optimal fair price *π
−
 
~
1
eI  
~
0
eI  
~
1
eI  
~
1
eI  
^
0
eI  
~
0
eI  
~ ^
0 0 0
e es I I= − >?  
*
Mπ
−
 
~
0 0 0
e es I I= − >?  
~
1 1 1
e eI I I= −?  
1
eI
?
 
0
eI
?
 
~
0 0 0
e es I I= − <
?
?  
~
1 1 1 0
e eI I I= − <
?
?  
 of π. Meanwhile, the slopes 
of both curve are same, the optimal expected incomes for 
combination of basic medical insurance and commercial 
medical insurance is (
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), the utility of medical 
insurance for the elderly is maximum. If there is not any 
change on the expected income 
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point is a tangent point where the non maximum utility of 
insurance income portfolio is (
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). In order to obtain 
the maximized effectiveness, the purchase of commercial 
insurance should be increased and enable the respected 
income in the unhealthy state reach to 
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0
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 which is in the 
state of equilibrium. The increment of insurance purchases 
is Δs=
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
-
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
>0.
(b) When indifference curve is moved from L1 to 
L2, if keep the original budget revenue line, the two 
curves will intersect at point M and the fair price of 
insurance will be 
*π
−
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. Obviously, the elderly will revalue 
the risks and returns in the state 1. (i) If the price of 
insurance is optimized at this time, the elderly will 
purchase commercial insurance in any case because 
the utility of insurance is much more than the cost of 
insurance purchase. (ii) If the price position of insurance 
is not optimal at this time, the elderly will behave in 
the perspective of risk preference. Risk Averters from 
the elderly will rise their expected utility by moving 
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the indifference curve from L2  to L1 and obtain the 
equilibrium point E1. In this case, the purchase of 
insurance will increase (Δ
*π
−
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1
eI  
~
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eI  
~
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eI  
~
1
eI  
^
0
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~
0
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~ ^
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?
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~
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?
?  
), the increment 
of income in healthy state is Δ
*π
−
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?
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?
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. The risk seeker 
from the elderly will decrease their expected utility by 
moving the budget revenue line from AB to CD and obtain 
a new equilibrium point E2. in this case, the optimal Porfit 
of expected income is (
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
,
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
). The purchase of insurance 
will decrease Δs=
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
-
^
0 0
e e
1
<0, the cost of risk will increase, 
the expected income in the healthy state will reduce 
ΔI1=
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
- 1 <0.
2.2 Substitution Effect for Basic Medical 
Insurance and Commercial Medical Insurance
Get the first-order derivative of α in Function (3) :
    '' ' '0 ( )
dU p U g f
d α αα
= ⋅ ⋅ − . (7)
Get the second-order derivative of α:
  
 2 '' ' ' 2 ' '' ''
1 02 ( ( ) ( ))
d U p U g f U f g
d α α α αα
= ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ − . (8)
As
d
d
,
d
d
 and
d
d
, therefore
d
d
and 
d
d
 . If we completely differentiate the optimal 
condition of first-order derivative
d
d
, we will 
get the optimal insurance purchase with optimal insurance 
price:
    
'' ' '
0
'' 2 ''
0 1
( )
(1 )
p U g fds
d p U p U
α α
α π
⋅ ⋅ −
=
⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅
. (7)
In the Equation (7), as U"0, U
"
1 less than 0 and 
d
d
, therefore 
d
d
. In this case, the fair price 
of insurance which is not the optimal is 
d
d
, 
the probability of elderly sickness is 
d
d
. So the two 
above is mutually alternative and there is crowding 
out effect: The higher the reimbursement rate of basic 
medical insurance is, the less the purchase of commercial 
insurance. On the contrary, the lower the reimbursement 
rate of basic medical insurance is, the more the purchase 
of commercial insurance is. That is showed as the line 
KQ in the graph 1. As the condition of maximizing 
utility is to change the expected income in the unhealthy 
state, the budget revenue line should be moved from 
AB to AF, and the equilibrium point will be changed 
from E1 to E3. in this case, the purchase of insurance is 
decrease(Δs=
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
-
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
<0) and the expected income in the 
unhealthy state is decrease. Meanwhile, the risk of cost 
will increase(ΔI1=
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
- 1 <0). So it shows following points: 
(i) once the reimbursement of basic medical insurance 
is increase, it is equivalent to raise the shadow price of 
commercial insurance and the purchase of commercial 
medical insurance reduce. (ii) When the elderly is in 
the unhealthy state, the expenditure of basic medical 
insurance is increasing and the expenditure of commercial 
medical insurance is decreasing. However, the increase 
of the expenditure from basic medical insurance can not 
make up for the decline of expenditure from commercial 
medical insurance, the difference between these two 
expenditures will be afforded by the elderly. So the reality 
is the medical expenditure increases and the expected 
utility reduces.
3.3 Complementary Relationship Between the 
Basic Medical Insurance and the Commercial 
Medical Insurance
If divide the Equation (7) by Equation (4), the result will 
be the degree of influence from basic medical insurance 
on purchase of commercial insurance:
   
 ' ' '0
' '
0 1
( )
(1 )
p U g fds
d p U p U
α α
α π
⋅ ⋅ −
=
⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅
. (9)
As U "0 more than 0 and 
d
d
 ,  in order to 
make
d
d ,  shou ld  make
d
d
. 
In this case, the fair price of insurance which is not the 
optimal is 
d
d
,the probability of elderly sickness 
is 
d
d
.So the two above is mutually complementary 
and there is income effect: the higher the reimbursement 
rate of basic medical insurance is, the more the purchase 
of commercial insurance. That is showed as the line QR 
in the graph 1. Assume that the initial equilibrium point 
is E2, the condition of maximizing utility is to change the 
expected income in the both unhealthy state and healthy 
state at same time, the budget revenue line should be 
moved from CD to AB, and the equilibrium point will 
be changed from E2 to E1. the elderly will increase the 
purchase of medical insurance and the expected utility 
will increase from L2 to L1. In this case, the purchase of 
insurance is increase (Δs=
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
-
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
>0) and the risk of cost 
will decrease (ΔI1=
~ ^
0 0
e e
1
- 1 >0). In the interval (E2,E1), 
it shows following points: (i) Once the basic medical 
insurance is complementary with the commercial 
medical insurance, the reimbursement of basic medical 
insurance is increase, and the purchase of commercial 
medical insurance is increase. So the investment in the 
purchase of commercial medical insurance will make the 
elderly feel ‘double security’. (ii) Although the increased 
reimbursement of basic medical insurance raises the 
shadow price of commercial insurance and the purchase 
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of commercial medical insurance reduce, the increased 
income of commercial medical insurance exceed highly 
than the increased price, the elderly will feel the increase 
of utility.
3.4 The Relationship Between the Two Types of 
Insurance Reimbursement
3.4.1 The Reimbursement Rate of Commercial 
Insurance β
Get the first-order derivative of β in Equation (3):
    ' '0
dU p U g
d ββ
= − ⋅ ⋅ . (10)
As 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
,
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
, 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
, there is no stationary point 
and this function is increasing function. Continually get 
the second-order derivative of β:
    
2
'' ' 2 ' '
0 02 ( ( ) )
d U p U g U g
d β ββ
= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ . (11)
As 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
,
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
,
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
, the 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
 . The function 
is a convex function; there is no maximum point but 
extreme point. If make 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
, it should get 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
. 
There is a suboptimal reimbursement rate for the payment 
function, which is equal to the marginal utility divided 
by the rate of change of marginal utility in the unhealthy 
state. Meanwhile the suboptimal reimbursement rate is the 
inflection point as well. In the interval 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
, the utility 
function is convex. At the inflection point, the utility 
function changes with the change of reimbursement rate 
of commercial insurance, so there is no optimal solution 
of the reimbursement rate of commercial insurance. In 
the interval 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
, the expected utility increases with the 
increased reimbursement rate of commercial insurance. 
In the interval which is larger than 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
 , the expected 
utility decreases with the increased reimbursement rate of 
commercial insurance. 
3.4.2 Interrelationship
If divide the Equation (7) by Equation (4) , the result is 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
:
   
 ' '
'
g fd
d g
α α
β
β
α
−
= − . (12)
As 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
,
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
, so 
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
. So the two above is 
mutually complementary. The implication is that when the 
reimbursement rate of basic medical insurance increases, the 
commercial medical insurance is in danger of being crowed 
out. The best way to reduce the risk is only be taken with 
‘following strategy’, that is to offset the negative impact 
from the increased reimbursement rate of the basic medical 
insurance by raising the reimbursement rate of commercial 
insurance. Therefore, the basic medical insurance can not 
completely replace the commercial medical insurance, 
but the partially crowed out of commercial insurance. 
CONCLUSION
To conclude, when the basic medical insurance and 
commercial medical insurance coexist, if there is an 
optimal price and optimal purchase for commercial 
medical insurance, the utility of elderly medical security 
is maximized. (i) The optimal price is the ratio of utility 
of marginal income in unhealthy life and healthy life. 
(ii) When the utility is not maximized, there are two 
ways to maximize the utility: One is to directly increase 
the purchases of commercial insurance; another is to 
assess risk and income after reduce budget revenue, and 
indirectly adjust the purchase of insurance. The success 
of second way is depending on the preference of risk 
from the elderly. The elderly who is a risk avoider will 
gain more expected utility by increasing the insurance 
purchases. The elderly who prefers the risk will reduce the 
budget revenue and decrease the insurance purchase.
When the probability of unhealthy life for the elderly 
is 
 1
2
p >
 1
2
p <
 , commercial medical insurance produces a 
crowding out effect on basic medical insurance. One the 
one hand, the higher the reimbursement rate of basic 
medical insurance is, the less the commercial insurance 
purchase is. On the contrary, the lower the reimbursement 
rate of basic medical insurance is,  the more the 
commercial insurance purchase is. On the other hand, 
this crowding out effect does not completely crowd out 
all but partially crowd out. (i) When the reimbursement 
of basic medical insurance increases, in order to continue 
to stay in the market, the reimbursement commercial 
medical insurance will increase as well. (ii) There is no 
optimal solution for the reimbursement of commercial 
medical insurance but only sub-optimal solution. When 
the reimbursement rate is over the sub-optimal solution, 
the expected utility of the elderly will decrease follow 
the increase of reimbursement rate, namely the marginal 
utility will change from increase to decrease.
When the probability of unhealthy life for the elderly 
is 
 1
2
p >
 1
2
p < , the complementary relationship between 
the basic medical insurance and commercial medical 
insurance will enhance the expected utility of the elderly. 
Because on the basis of the fairly optimal price, the 
increase of reimbursement rate of basic medical insurance 
will increase the purchases of commercial insurance. At 
this time, that will offer the feeling of “belt and braces” 
to elderly. Although, the shadow price of commercial 
insurance is increase, the increased amount of price is 
much less than the increased amount of income and the 
utility is enlarged.
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As at the beginning of model setting, we will not 
consider the difference from types and compensation way 
of commercial insurance and also ignore the exemption 
and starting point for reimbursement; this article may 
miss out some meaningful conclusion and need further 
researches to improve it.
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